Corruption is believed to be a major factor impeding economic development, but the importance of legal enforcement versus cultural norms in controlling corruption is poorly understood. To disentangle these two factors, we exploit a natural experiment, the stationing of thousands of diplomats from around the world in New York City. Diplomatic immunity means there was essentially zero legal enforcement of diplomatic parking violations, allowing us to examine the role of cultural norms alone. This generates a revealed preference measure of corruption based on real-world behavior for government officials all acting in the same setting. We find tremendous persistence in corruption norms: diplomats from high corruption countries (based on existing survey-based indices) have significantly more parking violations. In a second main result, officials from countries that survey evidence indicates have less favorable popular views of the United States commit significantly more parking violations, providing nonlaboratory evidence on the role that sentiment and affinity play in economic decision-making.
Introduction
The underlying causes of corruption remain poorly understood and widely debated. Yet the study of corruption beyond the realm of attitude surveys and cross-country analyses is still in its infancy, and there is little microeconomic evidence relating corruption to real-world causal factors. For example, social norms are often mentioned as a primary contributor to corruption in both the academic literature and the popular press, yet there is no evidence beyond the most casual of cross-country empirics. 1 Research on the causes of corruption is compounded by the difficulties inherent in disentangling the effects of social norms from the effects of legal enforcement. Specifically, societies that collectively place less importance on rooting out corruption, and thus have weak anti-corruption social norms, may simultaneously have less legal enforcement. Understanding the real causes of corruption is of central importance in reforming economic and social institutions: if corruption is predominantly norm-based, interventions that focus exclusively on boosting legal reforms will likely fail.
We develop an empirical approach for evaluating the role of social norms in corruption by studying parking violations among international diplomats living in New York City during 1997-2005. Consular personnel and their families benefit from diplomatic immunity, a privilege which allows them to avoid paying parking fines. We examine differences in the behavior of government employees from different countries, all living and working in the same city, all of whom can act with impunity in (illegally) parking their cars. The act of parking illegally fits remarkably well with a standard definition of corruption, i.e., "the abuse of entrusted power for private gain," 2 suggesting that the comparison of parking violations by diplomats from different societies serves as a credible measure of the extent of corruption cultural norms.
This setting has a number of advantages. Most importantly, our approach avoids the problem of differential legal enforcement levels across countries, and more generally strips out enforcement effects, since there was essentially no enforcement of parking violations for diplomats during the main study period. We thus intepret diplomats' behavior as reflecting their underlying propensity to break rules for private gain when enforcement is not a consideration. Additionally, because U.N. diplomats are largely co-located in Midtown Manhattan, we avoid many concerns of unobserved differences across living circumstances.
The first contribution of this approach lies in allowing us to construct a "revealed preference" measure of corruption for government officials across 146 countries. This objective measure, based on real rule-breaking, is arguably an improvement over existing country corruption indices that are typically based on subjective surveys of investors, and it is certainly much cheaper data to collect. 3 Existing measures are also difficult to interpret -what does moving from a score of "1" to a score of "2" on a cross-country index really mean? -while our parking violations measure has a much more precise definition and explicitly cardinal interpretation.
In our main empirical result, we find that this parking violation corruption measure is strongly positively correlated with other country corruption measures, and this relationship is robust to conditioning on country income, region fixed effects, and a wide range of other country controls (including government employee salary measures). This finding validates the usefulness of the new measure. It also goes against the predictions of simple economic models of crime in situations of zero legal enforcement (e.g., Becker 1968) , which would predict that parking violations would be high for all diplomats. Instead we find that diplomats from low corruption countries (e.g., Norway) behave remarkably well even in situations where they can get away with violations, suggesting that they bring the social norms or corruption "culture" of their home country with them to New York City.
An alternative explanation for this pattern warrants mentioning upfront. It is possible there are stronger social sanctions -for example, public embarrassment upon returning home -in low corruption countries against diplomats who commit many parking violations while in New York, relative to diplomats from high corruption countries. If the potential response of the home country, either informally or formally, is responsible for limiting parking violations, then diplomats' behaviors are better interpreted as an indication of their home country's culture rather than their own personal values. However, this is still consistent with our basic interpretation of the level of parking violations as a revealed preference measure of country corruption norms.
The parking violations data are at the individual diplomat level for over 1700 U.N. mission diplomats, allowing us to study how individual behavior changes over time and hence the evolution of corruption norms. For diplomats from high corruption countries of origin, a model of convergence to United States norms of compliance would (presumably) predict a decline in the rate of parking violations over time, as tenure in the U.S. increases. By contrast, a model of convergence to the "zero enforcement norm" would imply an increase in violations over time, particularly for officials from low corruption countries. We do find some evidence for the latter: the frequency of violations increases with tenure in New York City. However, in contrast to models of norm convergence, we do not find a statistically significant interaction effect of home-country corruption levels and tenure in New York, implying there is a similar (proportional) increase in rule-breaking for diplomats across the board from both high and low corruption countries.
The parking violation dataset also provides a novel window into issues of sentiment and affinity in individual decision-making. It is often claimed that sentiment has a major impact on important economic decisions as suggested by, for example, the frequent use of consumer boycotts to pressure corporate policies and the 'capitalization of patriotism' in low yield war bonds. However, the empirical evidence on this score remains contested. 4 We find that diplomats from countries where popular attitudes towards the United States tend to be unfavorable (based on comparable cross-country survey data from the Pew Global Attitudes Project 5 ) have significantly more parking violations than those from countries 4 There is a small but growing literature on consumer sentiment and purchasing behavior. Chavis and Leslie (2006) examine the effect of the Iraq War on French wine sales and find mixed results. In the domain of corporate social responsibility, Hiscox and Smyth (2006) find that 'good labor' labels have a strong impact on consumer demand. 5 These data are publicly available online at http://pewglobal.org/ (accessed March 9, 2006).
where attitudes towards the United States are positive. This setting is one in which diplomats can indulge their personal tastes for rule-breaking without punishment, and it appears that diplomats from countries where the U.S. is unpopular derive positive utility from breaking U.S. rules (or suffer less disutility than other diplomats from doing so).
A final empirical finding is worth highlighting. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001
attacks, there is a sharp -though temporary -drop in diplomatic parking violations, by roughly 80%. We find that countries with greater Muslim populations experience particularly sharp declines. We can only speculate about the exact causes of this change in behavior, but the fear of police harassment or negative media attention for the home country during that politically charged period is a possibility. There were hundreds of attacks on Muslims in the United States in the weeks following the 9/11 attacks (Council on
American-Islamic Relations 2002).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 describes the diplomatic parking situation in New York City and the violations data, section 3 discusses the rest of the dataset, section 4 contains the empirical results and the final section concludes.
Diplomatic Parking Violations in New York City
Diplomatic immunity provides consular officials and their families with protection from prosecution or lawsuits in their host country. The original intent of these laws was to protect diplomats from mistreatment in other countries, especially those not on friendly terms with the home country. 6 However, these days diplomatic immunity is more commonly viewed as the "best free parking pass in town" (BBC 1998 A crucial change in enforcement took place in October 2002, with the implementation of the Clinton-Schumer Amendment (named after the two senators from New York State), which gave the City permission to tow diplomatic vehicles, revoke their official parking permits, and have 110 percent of the total amount due paid from U.S. government aid to the offending diplomats' countries of origin (Singleton 2004) . We mainly focus on the pre-reform period, November 1997 through October 2002.
Parking violations actually fell substantially after the reform, suggesting that increased enforcement can sharply reduce corruption, but the basic cross-country patterns remain unchanged as we discuss below.
For most of the analysis we focus on the total amount of unpaid parking violations for a particular 
Cross-country data
We also employ country-level data on economic, political, and social characteristics, and in particular consider data on country corruption levels, using the corruption measure in Kaufmann et al (2005) from 1998, the earliest year with wide coverage. This is a composite corruption index that is essentially the first principal component of a number of commonly used corruption indices. By definition, therefore, it is quite highly correlated with the commonly used indices and is extremely highly correlated (ρ=0.97) with the Transparency International (TI) ratings from the same year. For ease of interpretation, we reverse the sign of the original measure so that higher values indicate higher levels of corruption. The mean value of this measure is zero, and it ranges from -1.6 to 2.6. The main advantages of this country measure are that its method of aggregation is clearly defined relative to the TI measure, and relative to other indices it has very broad country coverage. Finally, we consider whether unpaid violations appear to be driven primarily by an income effect.
We include the logarithm of GDP per capita in 1998 in U.S. dollars taken from the World Development
Indicators. Country-level income per capita is strongly correlated with corruption and with the rule of law, but, as we discuss below, despite this correlation the main results are robust to including income controls. Second, we include the ratio of government bureaucrat's salaries to GDP per capita (using data from Schiavo-Campo et al 1999) for the early 1990s (exact year differs by country) to account for the fact that bureaucrats occupy different positions in the national income distributions.
Our sample constitutes all countries that had 1998 population greater than one million according to the World Development Indicators, and for which basic country-level data were available. Table 2 presents summary statistics for both the country-level and diplomat-level variables.
Empirical Results
The main econometric specification in the cross-country analysis is presented in equation 1:
where i denotes the country, Corruption is the 1998 country corruption index, and X is a vector of other country controls, including the log of GDP per capita in 1998, region fixed effects, among others depending on the specification, and ε is a standard white noise disturbance term.
The New York City unpaid parking violations measure of corruption is robustly positively correlated with the existing country corruption index conditional on the number of U.N. Mission diplomats for that country in New York City (Table 3 , regression 1). The relationship is roughly linear (Figure 2 ). The coefficient estimate on the country corruption index is robust to the inclusion of log per capita income (regression 2) and also to the log of the number of vehicles registered to each mission as a control (regression 3), 11 though the point estimate drops by nearly half in the case of the income control.
The result is also robust to controlling for the average government wage relative to per capita income (regression 4) and to region fixed effects (regression 5). The regions with the greatest number of unpaid parking violations relative to the reference region (North America and the Caribbean) are Africa and the Middle East. Note that while the coefficient on corruption is robustly significantly significant across this range of specifications, the coefficient on country per capita income is unstable and sensitive to the sample used and choice of covariates.
The strong relationship between the parking violation corruption measure and the country corruption index also holds if the dependent variable is log (1 + Average Annual Unpaid Parking Violations / Diplomats) across all specifications (Table 4) , and similarly holds if a tobit specification is used rather than OLS (Appendix Table A1 ).
Since we can follow individual diplomats during their tenure at the U.N., we examine the related question of whether there is gradual evolution of diplomat norms once they move to New York City.
Conceptually, the relative plausibility of socialization to U.S. norms versus convergence to a uniform 11 Specifications that allow for more flexible relationships between number of vehicles and violations generate similar results, and imply a monotonic relationship consistent with the functional form we report in the (2) where i again denotes a country and j denotes an individual diplomat from that country in period t, X ijt is a vector of individual diplomat characteristics, and the final term is the error, which is allowed to be correlated across monthly observations for the same individual. The two key terms in this analysis are β 1 , the effect of increased time spent working as a consular official in New York City on parking violations for diplomats from countries with a corruption index of zero (corresponding to average corruption in the sample), and β 2 , the differential time effect for diplomats from countries with higher corruption.
The frequency of unpaid violations during the pre-enforcement period increases significantly with tenure in New York City (Table 5 , regression 1). This result is robust to the inclusion of diplomat fixed effects (regression 2), and to the use of a discrete measure of violations (regressions 4 and 5). In contrast to models of convergence to U.S. norms, we do not find a negative interaction effect of home-country corruption levels and tenure in New York. Rather coefficient estimates on the interaction term are positive and statistically significant, implying that there is, if anything, a divergence in the rate of violations over time, with diplomats from high corruption countries showing increasingly more violations relative to diplomats from low corruption countries over time. However, the point estimates indicate that even diplomats from low corruption countries (those with corruption index scores between -1 and -2) show some increase in violations over time. Finally, we note that the results are virtually identical if we repeat the analyses dropping individuals that arrived only after our earliest Bluebook was published (results not shown), which allows us to more accurately capture date of arrival. An additional robustness check based on a split of the sample by country parking violations also generated similar results (results not shown).
Various measures of proximity to the U.S. are correlated with fewer unpaid parking violations.
First, the log of the weighted average distance between a country's population and the U.S. population is strongly positively correlated with parking violations, even conditional on world region fixed effects (Table 6 , regression 1), indicating that countries physically closer to the U.S. have many fewer violations.
The exact reasons for this pattern are elusive, but greater trade, migration, and tourism between the countries are possible explanations.
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The Pew dataset provides a measure of popular attitudes towards the U.S. in a subset of 42 countries, and here we find that diplomats from countries in which popular attitudes are unfavorable are significantly more likely to have unpaid parking violations (Table 6 , regression 2). One possible explanation for this result, which would lead to a spurious correlation, is that individuals in countries that hold negative views about other countries in general also tend to be corrupt. However, the result remains robust when we include an additional attitudes control that reflects responses in the Pew survey to a parallel question on respondents' dislike of a neighboring country (regression 3). The coefficient estimate on this additional control is near zero and not statistically significant while the coefficient estimate on views towards the U.S. remains nearly unchanged and statistically significant at over 90% confidence.
The main limitation of this analysis in regressions 2 and 3 is the small sample size of only 42 countries 13 , the countries for which there is micro-survey data from Pew. In contrast, the association between the proportion of Muslim population in a country, which is widely thought to be related to anti-American 12 For example, trade with the United States is indeed negatively correlated with diplomats' parking violations, but this effect loses statistical significant when we control for geographic distance to the U.S. (results not shown). 13 This decline in sample size is responsible for the loss of statistical significance for the coefficient estimate on Corruption, which nonetheless remains similar in magnitude to the other specifications. 
Further Robustness Checks and Alternative Explanations
As noted in the introduction, informal or formal social sanction against diplomats in the home country may be responsible for restraining parking violations in some cases. In such cases, diplomats' behaviors are better interpreted as an indication of their home country's norms or culture rather than their own personal values. We acknowledge that individual values may partially explain our results, but note that this account remains consistent with our interpretation of the level of New York City parking violations as a revealed preference measure of corruption for government officials from a certain country, in the absence of formal legal enforcement.
Nonetheless, two findings argue against this alternative interpretation as the driver of our main finding. First, a Lexis-Nexis search of 504 European news outlets (English language or in translation) using the terms DIPLOMATS and PARKING and NEW YORK yielded only 25 stories during the period under study, and these stories were concentrated in just four countries (the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Russia). This suggests that sanctions for returning diplomats who accumulated parking tickets while abroad is almost universally a non-issue in Europe. Second, we considered whether unpaid parking violations early in an official's tenure at the United Nations in New York City is correlated with the length of his employment there, and further whether these early violations interact in any way with corruption in the country of origin (i.e., perhaps violators from low corruption countries could be punished by their government and sent home early, but that this would not be the case in high corruption countries). We find no evidence for such effects in our data (regressions not shown).
Obviously, neither of these two findings is conclusive. In equilibrium the number of violations committed will reflect choices made to avoid home country sanctions. But they are certainly consistent with the view that home country enforcement was typically weak or nonexistent.
An additional concern is that our country corruption measure may be picking up an income effect.
Wealthier diplomats could potentially have greater means to use parking garages or simply pay for any tickets, for example. However, this also seems unlikely. First, as noted above, we find that the index of country corruption robustly explains unpaid parking violations even conditional on national per capita income (and also controlling for the ratio of bureaucratic wages to per capita income). Further, the inclusion of paid violations in our parking measure has no effect on our main results (Appendix Table   A2 ). Once again, we acknowledge that our tests cannot conclusively rule out that income is playing some role, but the weight of the evidence argues heavily against this explanation.
A final consideration is whether there is a differential selection mechanism for U.N. diplomats across countries that might account for the pattern we observe. In particular, it would problematic if the relatively more corrupt government officials (within the distribution of officials in a country) were selected for New York postings from high corruption countries. We have no statistical test to explore this possibility, but we feel it is unlikely to be of first-order importance. In fact, to the extent that a selection effect is at work, we expect it to operate in the opposite direction: anecdotal evidence suggests that if anything U.N. postings offer fewer opportunities for graft than other government positions and thus would likely attract relatively less corrupt bureaucrats, possibly dampening the correlation between parking violations and home-country corruption.
Conclusion
We exploit a unique natural experiment -the stationing in New York City of thousands of government officials from 146 countries from around the world -in a setting of zero legal enforcement of parking violations to construct a revealed preference measure of official corruption. We find that this measure is strongly correlated with existing measures of home country corruption. This finding suggests that cultural or social norms related to corruption are quite persistent: even when stationed thousands of miles away, diplomats behave in a manner highly reminiscent of officials in the home country. Norms related to corruption are apparently very deeply engrained.
The second main empirical finding is the strong correlation between affinity for the United States in the diplomat's home country and parking violations in New York. This provides real-world empirical evidence that sentiments matter in economic decision-making. Of course, in the case we study the punishment for parking violations was essentially zero (at least in the pre-November 2002 period), allowing individuals to indulge their tastes without penalty.
The most important message of our main result is that corruption norms are sticky. This result raises the critical question of whether there are policy interventions that can modify norms over time. For example, the Bloomberg administration's enforcement efforts in New York City were extremely successful in changing diplomats' behaviors, and it would be extremely useful to know whether these changes might additionally have long-lasting effects on norms once individuals become habituated to rule compliant behavior. Such long-run effects of temporary interventions necessarily rely on a shift in norms, and would be consistent with the findings of Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003) on the persistent effects of auditing on corruption in Argentina. Unfortunately, our context does not accommodate this analysis.
More broadly, our methodology of inexpensively generating cross-country data could potentially be applied to other settings where many individuals from many countries are present in the same place for a period of concentrated activity (the Olympics Games, for example). We leave this and other extensions for future work. 1.1 (0.9) 1.1 (0.9) 1.3 (0.9) 1.1 (0.9) Notes: OLS regressions, White robust standard errors. Statistically significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. THA  KAZ  MUS  NER  CZE  LSO  BWA BTN  LKA  CHL  TUN  NPL IRN  FJI  ITA  LBR  MWI  PRY  RWA  UKR  ESP  PHL GHA  MRT  GIN  EST  MNG  ARM  CRI  COM  TGO VNM GEO  CHN  YEM VEN  PRT  UZB  MDG TZA  LBY KEN COG  HRV  DJI  SVK  FRA  IND  LAO  TKM  PNG HND  SVN  KGZ NIC  URY  SWZ  TJK  NAM  MEX  ARG  SGP  ROM UGA  HUN  MKD BOL  PER  HTI  JOR  BLR  BEL  CYP  GUY  AUT  GAB  RUS  LTU  SLV  POL  GMB  MYS  TTO  LBN  DEU  ERI  MDA  KOR  DOM  FIN  GTM  NZL GBR  NLD  ARE  AUS  AZE  BFA CAF  CAN  COL  DNK  ECU  GRC  IRL  ISR  JAM  JPN  LVA  NOR  OMN  PAN Mayer and Zignago (2005) . Their measure uses city-level data to assess the geographic distribution of population inside each nation. The idea is to calculate distance between two countries based on bilateral distances between the largest cities of those two countries, those inter-city distances being weighted by the share of the city in the overall country's population. In practice, nearly identical results are obtained using the distance of countries' capitals from Washington, D.C.
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(6) United Nations Bluebooks
The United Nations issues its list of mission personnel, or Bluebook, twice yearly. We utilize edition numbers 280 (May 1998) through 288 (August 2002). Documents were retrieved from the UN Official Document System (ODS), available at http://documents.un.org/advance.asp. Searching for the symbol ST/SG/SER.A/### with truncation turned off returns the relevant Blue Book (where ### is the Blue Book edition number).
(7) Mission Staff Counts
Edition 280 (May 1998) was checked by hand to count the mission staff and spouses for each country in the Blue Book, producing the following variables.
• Mission: Indicator variable indicating whether the country had a U.N. mission
• Staff: Simple count of staff; staff members were always listed with their surnames in bold (8) Longitudinal Staff Data Bluebook edition numbers 278 through 288 were converted into plain text format. A name-matching program then checked these text files against a list of names extracted from the NYC parking violations data. Names were converted to regular expressions to improve match quality (since names from parking violation data often used forward slashes in place of apostrophes and dashes). A name was considered to have matched (and thus to have been present at the date of the Bluebook's publication) if its first name and last name appeared on the same line in the Bluebook. If a name matched more one time in the same Blue Book, its matches were checked by hand. The matching program also recorded the staff position, which was specified on the line following the match, and the country of the mission in which the match was found. This country was checked against the country as specified by the parking violation data to verify the accuracy of the matches. Finally, in a small number of cases (20 diplomats), we found that there were gaps in the individual's appearance in the Blue Book, even though in some cases parking violations in vehicles registered to these individuals took place during the purported absence. We omit these observations from our analyses, but in practice their inclusion does not affect the point estimates or significance of our results (results not shown). These data were provided to us by Iliana Kuziemko and Eric Werker. We utilize data on aid flows from 1998. See Kuziemko and Werker (2006) for details.
